





It is an indisputable fact that Europe’s population is
getting older.This puts pressure on the majority of the
social protection schemes in Europe which, founded
on systems of distribution, are no longer sustainable
in the face of increased needs.The care for those who
are no longer autonomous and need external assis-
tance will continue to grow. Insurance can provide
realistic, effective, fair and virtuous responses, insofar
as the public authorities do not pre-empt the market
and a real public-private partnership is established
with the merits of a market solution in the European
context of the welfare state.
Long-term care is not only the consequence of a
choice of lifestyle and social relations,both with fam-
ily and neighbours,it is also largely a result of genet-
ic determinants as well as day-to-day accidents over
which the policyholders have little control. It can
therefore be covered by an insurance policy using
traditional market methods. Economic analysis and
accumulated experience show the market’s capacity
to meet the objective needs of long-term care.
Covering these needs requires that three well-known
risks are managed effectively: moral hazard, adverse
selection and the escalation of trends.
The concern expressed in various countries, notably
in Europe, to satisfy the objectives of the welfare
state and to offer all households long-term care
cover, even for the most needy, may find a suitable
solution within a public-private partnership that is
carefully designed to reconcile market incentives
and solidarity.
Nature of long-term care and of the long-term care
risk for insurance
Long-term care is a risk that can be objectivised
Firstly, loss of autonomy should be clearly distin-
guished from illness, disability and handicap,
although these four concepts are not totally inde-
pendent of each other:
• Loss of autonomy denotes an inability to perform
some of the most basic everyday activities due to
old age (e.g., getting up, dressing, washing, eating,
walking and so on) and the need for assistance in
order to carry out such activities;
• Illness denotes an objective, temporary situation
of ill health (such as fever, depression, etc.) and a
need for therapeutic care (i.e. medical consulta-
tion, medication, surgical intervention, etc.);
• Disability denotes a reduced capacity for normal
activity following an accident or an illness, with-
out necessarily implying the need for assistance;
• Handicap denotes a physical or psychological lim-
itation in the accomplishment of normal activity
and may be associated with a need for assistance.
Three main analysis scales are used to provide a way
of measuring loss of autonomy that aims to be objec-
tive.These are summarised in the Table, which clear-
ly shows their common points and their differences.
We can therefore conclude that there is an apparent
consensus on what is actually included in the long-
term care that should be covered by insurers. It
should be noted that one third of the French insurers
use the ADL approach, another third a combination
of the ADLs with the AGGIR scale and the last third
the AGGIR scale.
The material triggers of long-term care are themselves
standard: dementia (25–50 percent of cases), cancer
(15–30 percent of cases),cardiovascular diseases (15–30
percent of cases), other neuropsychiatric diseases
(10–20 percent of cases), rheumatology (2–10 percent
of cases), accidents (5–10 percent of cases) and oph-
thalmic diseases (1–3 percent of cases).
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Based on its French portfolio, SCOR’s data show
that a 60-year-old has a significant probability of suf-
fering a severe loss of autonomy (inability to handle
3 of the 4 ADLs). Women have a 48 percent proba-
bility of requiring long-term care before their death,
against a mere 30 percent for men. Based on a
French survey (FFSA 2005), the remission rate for
severe loss of autonomy is negligible (~ 1 percent).
For partial loss of autonomy (inability to carry out 
2 of the 4 ADLs), the remission rate is much higher
(25 percent of the surveyed population with a partial
loss of autonomy experienced remission two years
after the first survey). Worsening from partial to
severe loss of autonomy affects 5 percent of the sur-
veyed population over a two-year period.
Three major risks for the insurer, which determine
its insurability
The insurability of a risk depends both on the nature
of the risk transferred to the insurer and the insurer’s
ability to correctly price this risk. Materially, fore-
casts of the number of persons requiring long-term
care are based on four factors:prevalence (the prob-
ability of requiring long-term care within the refer-
ence population), incidence (the probability of fal-
ling into the category of those
requiring long-term care), remis-
sion (the probability of exiting the
category of those requiring long-
term care) and mortality (the mor-
tality differential between persons
requiring long-term care and those
who do not).But to understand the
need for assistance related to long-
term care, it is also important to
consider the existence of potential
caregivers, spouses, children or
neighbours, who themselves de-
pend on several factors (life expec-
tancy, life expectancy without loss
of autonomy, frequency of separa-
tion of couples, fertility, rate of em-
ployment of children,level of social
relations within the family).For the
insurer, we can sum up long-term
care as carrying three major risks,
which determine its insurability:
• The risk of escalation: accord
ing to some experts, an exten
sion of lifespan goes hand in 
hand with an extension of the 
time spent with a disability,that
is, in a situation of total or partial loss of autono-
my. Long-term care is an emerging risk whose
total cost will increase more rapidly than national
wealth. This naturally raises the problem of pric-
ing insofar as the underlying trend is still not
properly understood, policyholders themselves
being inclined to underestimate the impact in-
volved.The risk, therefore, is that supply and de-
mand curves for long-term care products only
meet at a point where the supply of services is
very restricted or even inexistent.Studies based on
a comparison of several statistical sources none-
theless show that this fear is not grounded and that
we are not actually experiencing a “pandemic” of
disability,particularly severe disability:there are as
many countries where the number of old people
requiring long-term care grows more quickly than
the number of old people not requiring long term
care (cf. Belgium, Japan, Sweden) as there are
countries where it grows less quickly (cf. Italy,
France, USA; Lafortune and Balestat 2007; Jacob-
zone 2000). Studies exploring the links between
lifestyle and loss of autonomy could also eventual-
ly significantly alter the trends observed in the
past,once these studies lead to the development of
efficient prevention techniques.
Table
Main  assessment scales used around the world
Katz scale (used throughout the world) AGGIR scale (used in
France)
Activities of daily life
(used by American
insurers)
Activities of daily life





Iso resources groups – GIR
(used by French public
authorities for eligibility to
LTC public benefit and by
some French insurers) ex-
cluding GIR 6
Bathing Bathing Occasional help for washing
and home care
Dressing Dressing Loss of autonomy for more
than one ADL 
Transferring Transferring Help several times a day for
ADLs
Feeding  Feeding  Confined or impaired men-
tal faculties 
Toileting – Bedridden or confined to an
armchair + mental faculties
severely impaired
Continence – – 
Loss of autonomy =
inability to carry out
2 of these 6 activities
without the help of a
third person
Loss of autonomy =
inability to carry out
2 of these 4 activities
without the help of a
third person
Loss of autonomy = belong-
ing to one of the last 4 
categories above
 Source: Katz, Down, Cash and Grotz (1970); SCOR; French Ministry of
 Social Affairs.• The risk of adverse selection:the only people tak-
ing out long-term care policies are people who
know that they have a high risk of losing their
autonomy. It has been observed that people buy-
ing long-term care insurance contracts have a
higher probability of losing their autonomy than
those who do not buy such contracts (Finkelstein
and McGarry 2003), and people who discontinue
their contracts have a much lower probability of
losing their autonomy than those who do not
(Finkelstein, McGarry and Sufi 2005). This is a
classic health insurance risk, which should be
treated under identical conditions.
• The moral hazard: this probably constitutes the
greatest challenge for long-term care insurance. In
long-term care, moral hazard has less to do with
the behaviour of the policyholder than with his
social environment. The perception of long-term
care as a risk is a very recent phenomenon. It has
less to do with the increasing wealth of society
than with rural exodus and the desire for autono-
my of both parents and children, with the result
that elderly parents are less and less likely to live
under the same roof as their children. This devel-
opment is certainly nearing its end, but it empha-
sises the point to which the idea of loss of autono-
my is determined by social perception.There is no
reason to assume that this social perception will
stabilise over the next few years.It is even less like-
ly to settle down in that the criteria for loss of auto-
nomy are relatively vague and susceptible to wide-
ly varying interpretations depending on the social
climate – in the future we may consider that hav-
ing trouble taking a bath constitutes a sufficient
indication of loss of autonomy,etc.The major esca-
lation in handicap allowances, which are still ex-
periencing double-digit growth in developed coun-
tries, independently of the actual health status of
the populations involved, is a good illustration of
what could happen in the future with long-term
care. If this risk has not yet materialised for long-
term care, it is because the stakes until now have
been low. Once long-term care becomes an issue
for society and has its own dedicated rights and
laws, etc., the risk of ex post escalation of the con-
tent of long-term care insurance contracts signed
years before, especially through court decisions,
may become a reality. This may happen on three
levels:the point at which one is considered to have
lost autonomy, how severe the loss of autonomy is
considered to be, and the level of assistance con-
sidered to be normal in relation to a certain degree
of loss of autonomy.
The relevance of a market solution and its place in
the European welfare state
Market solutions are relevant
In many countries, the private long-term care insur-
ance market is still very narrow, with very different
trends: it is experiencing very rapid growth in some
countries (e.g., Spain, Italy, South Korea) but is stag-
nant in others (e.g.,Germany,UK,Nordic countries).
However,it is a statement of fact that a market exists
for long-term care cover, as long as the private offer
has not been ousted by an aggressive public offer.
What is most worrying for the future is that the long-
term sustainability of this aggressive public offer is
threatened by the inadequate selectivity with regard
to the schemes put in place, as well as by the wider
crisis of the welfare state.
The largest worldwide market is the American mar-
ket,with over 6 million policyholders and 25 years of
experience. However, the market contracted at a
constant pace of 10 percent per year until only
recently. The difficulties that have hit the American
market can be explained to a certain extent by the
dynamism of the public Medicaid system (Brown,
Coe and Finkelstein 2006; Brown and Finkelstein
2004) but also, as we shall see, by the inadequacy of
the products supplied by the insurers. The second
largest worldwide market, located in Europe, is the
French market with around 3 million policyholders,
a growth rate of 15 percent per year and 20 years of
experience. We should note that in a country like
France, where public authorities have only recently
committed to covering long-term care, the number
of policyholders (~3 million) is significantly higher
than the number of people receiving public aid (~1
million).Interestingly,these two leading markets are
based on two different models of cover for long-term
care risks (Taleyson 2003):
• In the United States, long-term care insurance
contracts are generally individual and provide for
the reimbursement of care and services costs up
to a certain limit, with multiple options.These are
products whose philosophy is derived from health
insurance products. They are distributed by
agents’ networks and are tax qualified.
• In France, long-term care insurance contracts can
be individual or collective and provide for the
payment of a monthly cash benefit, which may be
proportionate to the degree of loss of autonomy
and adjusted according to the evolution of this
loss of autonomy in the latest generation of con-
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tracts. These are products whose philosophy is
derived from disability annuities products. They
are distributed by direct selling networks and are
not tax qualified.
Particularly in France, there is a high demand from
the public authorities and various associations for
the creation of a fifth risk of “social security”, as is
the case in Germany.Such an approach does,howev-
er, present many disadvantages in relation to the
advantages that society would experience from a
public-private partnership:
• It would come up against the limited leeway for
manoeuvring public finances, which would re-
strain cover in relation to objective needs;
• It would be rigid,without the capacity to adapt to
the objective diversity of needs and situations,
incapable of experimenting with new forms of
risk cover and questioning acquired advantages
when they can no longer be justified;
• If based on the “pay-as-you-go” principle, it would
transfer the costs entirely to future generations
regardless of the principles of sustainable develop-
ment and would constitute the last in a long series of
transfers purely for the profit of the baby boomers;
• It would be very sensitive to being captured by in-
terest groups and would have difficulty in resist-
ing the pressure exerted to distort solidarity de-
pending on matters of economic urgency;
• It would have difficulties preventing cost escala-
tion, with a risk of exploitation by long-term care
professionals as illustrated by the agreement on
tariffs negotiated between the service providers
in certain countries.
It is therefore important to construct a protection
system that is suited to the effective needs of people
under long-term care, i.e., a system that is:
• In proportion to the degree of effective loss of
autonomy;
• Objective, to limit the moral hazard linked to the
subjective perception of the loss of autonomy and
which, as we have seen above, probably consti-
tutes the major challenge in long-term care insur-
ance;
• Controllable, to manage costs.
• Open to innovation, to best satisfy the needs and
reduce the costs;
• Fair and funded, to prevent the costs from being
transferred to future generations.
Insurance market cover would avoid these disadvan-
tages or at least would soften them thanks to com-
petition, whilst meeting the effective needs of per-
sons under long-term care.
Co-ordination with the welfare state: which model
for Europe?
In Europe in particular, co-ordination with the wel-
fare state is important.The plan would include a uni-
versal guarantee for long-term care, which assumes
perfect co-ordination between the market and the
state, within a public-private partnership of a new
kind. This cover could be based on the following
main principles:
• Cover of severe long-term care only, which corre-
sponds to a real risk (low frequency, high severi-
ty) and a “personal catastrophe” for the house-
holds affected (light long-term care is,on the con-
trary, not a risk but a virtual certainty for each of
us);
• Cover which takes the form of an annuity;
• Freedom for households to choose, with tax
incentives for protection and eventually penalisa-
tion for non-protection;
• Public-private partnership with state intervention
for the least solvent demand,in the form of a pub-
lic benefit, the financing of which would depend
on the household’s wealth.
Principle 1:A model focussing solely on heavy long-
term care with a monetary benefit in the form of an
annuity
It is important that the agents have a good under-
standing of the products and the cover that they pro-
vide.The products must be sufficiently simple, with-
out too many options,whilst remaining flexible.They
must also be easily comparable from one company
to the next, so that the policyholder can optimise his
choice. And the insurers must be able to control
them so as to limit the risk premium for material
uncertainties for the long-term care itself. The sys-
tem should therefore favour:
• Heavy long-term care, excluding light long-term
care, not only because the latter does not pose a
real financial problem to households (it does not
incur significant expenses and corresponds not so
much to a risk as to a virtual certainty) but also
because it is more difficult to appreciate objec-
tively, it is more likely to give rise to escalation or
even to fraud. Insurance cover would correspond
therefore to a consolidated state of long-term care
defined with reference to the objective inability to
carry out, without the help of a third person, cer-tain activities of daily life (on the Katz scale). For
cases of dementia, cover could be based on
Folstein’s MMS (mini mental state) examination.
The cover would be defined by an approved “long-
term care” contract, which would define the level
of basic service related to the different degrees of
loss of autonomy,in agreement with the profession
and the public authorities (possibly including rep-
resentation of policyholders).The policyholder, du-
ly informed of this approved contract, would not,
however, be under any obligation to subscribe to it:
he would have the possibility of subscribing to only
a part of it, adding additional cover, or even sub-
scribing to a different contract.
• A monetary benefit in the form of a monthly fixed
sum.Experience in Germany and the US has shown
that ”cost-plus” type contracts are largely un-
suitable as the policyholder has difficulty in making
a choice between the different options faced with a
risk of which he tends to have no concrete experi-
ence, or of which he refuses to imagine the conse-
quences. In addition, from the point of view of the
insurer,recent economic theory (Laffont and Tirole
1993) shows that it is optimal for the principal (the
insurer), if he does not want to be the residual
claimant,to use fixed-price contracts that attribute a
fixed sum to the agent, leaving him to spend it on
the necessary care at his own discretion. This con-
trasts with “cost-plus” type contracts, which reim-
burse all of the costs exhibited by the agent.
In such a scheme,the revaluation of the benefits pro-
vided would be contractual and revisable in accor-
dance with inflation and the change in the rate of the
loss of autonomy of the person. It could include a
capital payment to equip the home. The degree of
loss of autonomy would itself be assessed by an inde-
pendent appraisal implemented by the profession.
Similarly, the contract would be authorised to allow
contributions or benefits to be adjusted during the
life of the contract in order to make up for any pos-
sible escalations which would not be absorbed by the
constitution of long-term provisions. Faced with the
risk of adverse selection which, as we have seen
above, is one of the three major risks which deter-
mine the insurability of long-term care, the insurer
would be allowed to set an age limit on subscription
and to adjust the fee structure depending on the
state of health of the insurance applicants. Finally,
the contract should allow policyholders to revise
their choice and transfer their contract from one
insurer to another, with reasonable penalties for the
policyholder.
Principle 2:A Model based on freedom of choice with
tax incentives and penalisation for non-protection
For such a plan to quickly reach critical mass, it is not
only necessary to make households aware of the risk
constituted by long-term care at pivotal points in their
life (birthday, retirement, change in situation, taking
out an insurance contract, etc.) by mobilising the
appropriate participants (employers, pension funds,
insurers, bankers, etc.) but also to adapt the tax sys-
tem so as not to reduce interest in this type of guar-
antee when subscription is not mandatory, given that
the agents structurally tend to under-estimate the
likelihood of occurrence and severity of far-off cata-
strophic events (Kahneman and Tversky 1974; 1980).
The policyholder’s payments would thus be exempt
from social and tax deductions, in the same way as if
the payments were made to a social security system.1
With the aim of fairness,it would also be desirable to
go beyond a simple tax exemption and to provide a
refundable tax credit which would allow all house-
holds, irrespective of their level of income and their
marginal tax rate to benefit from the same ratio of
tax support. The benefit paid in the event of long-
term care would also be exempt from income tax
and social contributions, up to a certain limit, given
that it is not per se a replacement income.The insur-
ers would only be able to offer long-term care cover
which benefits from these advantages if they adhere
to a guarantee fund set up and managed by the pro-
fession, under the responsibility of the insurers con-
cerned, and which would be authorised to adjust its
contribution depending on the financial strength of
the insurance company and the quality of its reinsur-
ance programme.
Principle 3: A model supplemented by public wel-
fare, the financing of which would depend on the
resources of the households concerned
It is desirable to permit households not to take out
insurance or to take out only partial insurance – this
choice may be dictated by either financial con-
straints (insufficient resources) or by an economic
and social optimisation calculation.
Any person losing autonomy who is not covered by
long-term care insurance or who has only partial cov-
er would be eligible for a public long-term care bene-
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fit. However, only those whose resources are insuffi-
cient would be able to benefit free of charge. For the
others,a financial participation increasing in line with
the household’s resources would be required; this
could extend as far as a charge on the estate, when
households’ resources are sufficient, in order to dis-
suade free-riders.
For this partnership between the market and the
state to be effective, it would of course be necessary
for the scales on which long-term care is evaluated to
be harmonised or at least co-ordinated. Due to its
great objectivity,the Katz scale with the autonomous
exercise of the ADLs, in association with Folstein’s
MMS test,would be favoured over others such as the
AGGIR scale.
Conclusion
In European countries where there are mandatory
health insurance schemes, long-term care should
really be “non-medical”, in other words, the health
care required by the aged needing assistance should
be borne by these schemes. In this perspective, long-
term care would only provide services to that part of
the population experiencing difficulties with daily
life. In the US, if the health reform is finally imple-
mented, health care will be borne by this new
scheme, allowing insurers to provide long-term care
on non-medical basis and thereby reducing the cost
of existing long-term care policies.
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